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Abstract 
Title: Usefulness of financial reports - a study of the information need in banks’ 
credit assessment. 
 
Background and problem: Financial reports are created for the users as decision 
support. Stakeholders are often subjects to information asymmetry. Banks represent 
one of the primary stakeholders and financiers of a company, and place great 
emphasis on financial reports in their credit assessment process. The question is, 
however, how useful the financial information actually is. According to previous 
research, banks consider accounting information as troublesome in some respects, 
mostly due to accounting choices and judgments. As the newly introduced K-
regulations in Sweden are mandatory from 2014, it is not clear how the choice 
between K2 and K3 will affect a company’s creditworthiness. 
 
Purpose: The purpose of this study is to investigate the usefulness of accounting 
information presented in financial reports, as a part of banks’ information need in the 
credit assessment process.  
 
Methodology: To achieve the purpose, a qualitative research was used. Empirical 
material was gathered through semi-structured interviews with respondents 
representing five different banks in Sweden. The respondents were bank officers 
with great knowledge in the credit assessment process. Secondary data formed the 
frame of reference, and was collected mainly from scientific articles and doctoral 
dissertations.  
 
Findings and conclusions: This study shows that accounting information is useful 
and represents one of the main components in the corporate analysis when the bank 
is performing credit assessment. Since the banks’ rating systems do not alter financial 
information; two identical companies, apart their choice of K2 and K3, may receive 
different ratings and consequently different interest rates. However, banks thorough 
corporate analysis is favorable when changes in accounting regulations are 
implemented. As they possess great knowledge in the company’s business, 
accounting choices and regulations becomes almost a non-issue. 
 
Keywords: Accounting, financial reports, user, bank, K2, K3, credit assessment, 
corporate analysis, rating.  
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1. Introduction 
The first chapter contains a problem discussion regarding usefulness of financial reports for 
the bank, as one of the main users and stakeholders. More specifically, how the relationship 
between the bank and the company can lead to information asymmetry and consequently 
cause undesired effects. The purpose of examining the above is formulated into three research 
questions. This is followed by outlining this study’s specific contributions and limitations. 
Lastly, definitions of recurrent terms and concepts are presented. 
1.1 Background and problem discussion 
One of the main reasons why a company puts effort into accounting is to satisfy its 
users. Stakeholders can be investors, employees, financial institutes and suppliers 
(Freeman et al, 2010). According to the larger standard-setters, a stakeholder should 
be satisfied when the information is useful for decision making (Young, 2006). The 
usefulness might depend on the user and it is rather diffuse to what extent financial 
information is adapted to the stakeholders and how useful the information given in 
financial reports actually is (Young, 2006). 
 
According to Bruns (2004), external stakeholders are often subjects to information 
asymmetry, especially when it comes to small and medium sized companies. Larger 
listed companies’ need to submit information regarding their activities at the stock 
market, while smaller companies do not have the same obligations and resources to 
collect and submit such information. Instead, the company’s board and owners 
possess most information, which might not be documented or accessible to external 
stakeholders (Bruns, 2004). Due to today’s principles-based regulations, stakeholders 
of smaller companies sometimes experience discomfort with the possibility for 
judgments that these regulations bring, which in turn can affect the result (Svensson, 
2003). Information asymmetry tends to increase risk and consequently cause higher 
costs for a stakeholder when doing business with the company (Andersson, 2001). 
 
There are several groups of stakeholders in need of financial information provided 
by a company. One of the primary stakeholders in Sweden are banks (Marton, 2013). 
For many reasons, it is virtually impossible to conduct business without some kind of 
relationship to a bank. Further, bank financing is one of the main sources for capital 
among companies in Sweden (Bruns, 2004). During 2012, companies in Sweden 
borrowed a total of 1163 billion SEK from banks (Swedish Bankers’ Association, 
2013). According to Bruns and Fletcher (2007), the produced financial statement is 
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one of the areas where creditors put most emphasis. This indicates that the 
accounting information received today fulfills their need to some extent, even though 
it may have to be altered in order to show the ‘real’ underlying result, and additional 
information needs to be evaluated (Svensson, 2003).  When banks are granting credit, 
they put a price on the risk they take; lower risk equals lower interest rates and vice 
versa (Andersson, 2001). Lack of information increases risk, since there is less 
information to evaluate (Bruns, 2004). 
 
Since banks already see the use of accounting information as somewhat troublesome 
due to the possibilities to affect results with judgments and other results smoothing 
activities (Svensson, 2003), it may be headed in the direction of getting even more 
difficult in the near future. From 2014, it is mandatory to choose between the new 
accounting regulations K2 and K3 for the majority of Swedish companies. The 
accounting regulations are fundamentally different, as K2 is considered as a rule-
based system and K3, on the other hand, is principles-based (BFN, 2013). Depending 
on the regulation system, two otherwise identical companies could produce very 
different financial statements. As mentioned earlier, criticism considering principle-
based systems usually is based on the fact that companies can alter the result with 
judgments (Svensson, 2003). The main criticism of rule-based systems is, instead, due 
to companies trying to structure transactions to work around the rules and thereby 
affecting the result in a desired way (Baily & Sawers, 2012). 
 
With two different regulations for companies to choose between, the following 
questions arise: does the choice matter? Will credit granting be affected as a 
consequence of differences in the regulations, or is one regulation more suitable for 
companies that are in need of bank financing to conduct their business? It is unclear 
how banks reason and if they are taking possible differences that may occur into 
consideration in their corporate analysis. Considering accounting information 
constitutes a component in the credit assessment process, its quality is of importance 
in order to determine a company’s creditworthiness, but also for efficient allocation 
of capital on the market (Svensson, 2003).  
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the usefulness of accounting information 
presented in financial reports, as a part of banks information need in the credit 
assessment process.  
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1.2.1 Research questions 
To investigate the usefulness of accounting information in financial reports, the 
following research questions are examined: 
 
 What kind of information is required (financial and non-financial) and how is it used 
in banks credit assessment process?  
 
 How does accounting information from financial reports matter for Swedish banks as 
users? 
 
 How can differences in accounting regulations, as the ones between K2 and K3, affect 
a company’s creditworthiness?  
1.3 Contribution 
This study contributes with gaining new insights on how one of the main 
stakeholders is closing the information gap between them and the company; through 
corporate analysis and risk rating in the credit assessment process. Thus, minimizing 
risk and decrease transaction costs (Andersson, 2001). 
 
The main debate around rule-based versus principles-based accounting regulations 
has concerned US-GAAP in relation to IFRS. This study instead shows how credit 
assessments are affected by two different comprehensive regulation systems, K2 and 
K3, selectable for companies within the same context.  
1.4 Limitations 
The financial reports’ usability will only be viewed from a creditor’s perspective. The 
focus will thus be on lenders as banks in Sweden, consequently other types of credit 
institutions and other lenders not are included in this study.  
 
It is the credit assessment that is in focus; no further immersion in other kinds of 
assessments when the bank is doing business with a company is taken into account. 
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1.5 Abbreviations and definitions 
Almi: Organization that provides venture capital and advisory services in the 
establishment phase of a business. 
BFL (Bokföringslagen): The Swedish Accounting Law. 
Branch: A banking office where advisory and other financial services are offered to 
private and/or corporate customers. 
Corporate advisor: Bank officer with specialization in corporate matters. 
Corporate loan officer: A corporate advisor with the mandate to grant credit to 
companies. 
Corporate analysis: Evaluation of a company’s financial and non-financial position. 
Credit: A loan or financing solution for a company or an individual, provided by 
banks and other financial institutions. 
Credit assessment: A process in banks when analyzing and evaluating a company’s 
possibility to obtain credit. 
Creditworthiness: Ability for a company to pay its debts, which is assessed in the 
credit assessment process. It is usually measured in rating systems. 
K-project: A project with the purpose to simplify financial reporting for companies in 
Sweden, based on rules in the Swedish Accounting Law (BFL).  
Lag (2004:297) om bank- och finansieringsrörelse: Law governing the Swedish banking 
operations. 
Swedish Companies Registration Office (Bolagsverket): Organization responsible for 
making Swedish companies’ annual reports official. 
Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (Finansinspektionen): Authority supervising 
Swedish banks and other financial institutions. 
UC (Upplysningscentralen): Credit Reporting Agency in Sweden, providing credit 
reports to banks, the public sector and companies in different industries. 
ÅRL (Årsredovisningslagen): The Swedish Annual Accounts Act. 
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2. Frame of reference 
To understand why the bank is interested in information about a company’s financial 
position, the second chapter presents theories explaining the stakeholder-company-
relationship and how the asymmetric information between them leads to transaction costs. 
The selected theories create a basis for this study, in order to explain further how banks reason 
when it comes to credit assessment. In addition, a presentation of rule-based and principles-
based regulations is outlined, to gain understanding in how differences in accounting occur 
due to various guidelines. The distinct differences between the Swedish K2 and K3 
regulations are described as well as illustrated in a practical example. 
2.1. Stakeholder theory 
There is no doubt that a company to a great extent is influenced by its surroundings. 
To illustrate this, the stakeholder term was created by Freeman in 1984, to prove that 
a company has more groups than stockholders to meet the needs of (Freeman et al, 
2010). The stakeholder perspective is about how customers, suppliers, employees, 
financiers such as stockholders and banks, communities and managers interact with 
the company. 
 
Relationships and interactions that the company has to its business environment do 
not only include the obligation to meet the stakeholders’ need, but is also influenced 
by them to different degrees (Mainardes, Alves & Raposo, 2011). It is stated that a 
common feature for Swedish companies is the need of external financing to conduct 
business (Winborg & Landström, 2000). Bank loans are thus one of the most 
important financing sources, which makes the company’s understanding of factors 
that can have an impact on the chance of obtaining a loan essential. 
 
Freeman et al (2010) clarifies that when researchers and practitioners a few decades 
back were looking for answers to explain management problems, it mostly involved 
questions about how value is created and traded in a constant changing and global 
business context. Also, what kinds of connections that exist between capitalism and 
ethics. In order to answer these questions, the stakeholder theory suggests that the 
analysis should be built on all relationships that can affect a company. According to 
Freeman et al (2010), these problems can best be solved by putting the stakeholder 
theory into center when discussing business and management, since these 
relationships are essential for the existence of a company. Since the beginning of the 
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stakeholder concept up until today, its importance has increased through greater 
general interest and media coverage. 
2.2. Principal-agent theory 
As stakeholders and companies do business together, benefiting from each other’s 
knowledge, services and payment, their positions rarely are the same. This can be 
described with the help from the agency theory, showing that interaction may lead to 
undesirable consequences. The theory takes its starting point in stating that the agent 
is the one who performs the work that the principal asks of him. This relationship 
might cause so called agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Firstly, interests 
and goals may differ between the parties and therefore conflict with each other, and 
it is difficult for the principal to investigate whether the agent has acted according to 
what has been agreed upon. Secondly, problems concerning risk sharing that occur 
when the view of risk differs can lead to different opinions on how to act 
accordingly. Therefore, the principal-agent theory concentrates on what is the most 
efficient contract between the two parts (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
The kind of relationship that the principal-agent theory can be applied on is between 
the bank as a lender to a company. The bank represents the principal who is in need 
of information to make assessments, and the company possesses this information to a 
greater extent than the bank, such as risks and possibilities as well as expected return 
(Bruns, 2004). However, the situation may be contrary since the bank sometimes has 
better knowledge on an aggregated level about projects or businesses that might be 
successful for a small or medium sized company (Bruns, 2004).  This kind of 
information asymmetry in one or both directions therefore occurs when one of the 
parties has better information than another, which will be discussed further in 
section 2.2.1. 
 
2.2.1 Information asymmetry 
Asymmetric information is a result of agency problems discussed in the previous 
section. Akerlof (1970) explained the phenomenon by using the car market, where 
the seller knows more about the car than the buyer. In sum, the information 
asymmetry leads to uncertainty about the quality of the car. This consequently makes 
sellers of ‘good’ cars avoid putting theirs on the market, which creates a market for 
‘bad’ cars called ‘lemons’ in America. 
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The basis of Akerlof’s (1970) theory is attributable to the relationship between lenders 
and borrowers. Even though there might be an information imperfection in both 
directions, almost always the bank is dependent on the information given by the 
company (Bruns, 2004). This advantage appears when an owner or manager in the 
company enhances information that can be beneficial for the company, not primarily 
in accordance with benefits for the bank. There may also be a lack of information 
when a small or newly established business needs bank financing (Svensson Kling, 
1999). Further, the information asymmetry is proved to be most prominent among 
privately held companies. Mainly due to the fact that these companies have one 
owner who also is in control, since behavior and personality influence the business to 
a great extent (Bruns, 2004). According to Svensson (2003), asymmetric information 
leads to greater uncertainty and inefficient capital allocation. This uncertainty has its 
price, as higher risk equals higher interest rates (Andersson, 2001), which is further 
discussed in section 2.2.2 concerning the transaction cost theory. 
 
In contrast to publicly held companies, the privately held have less legal demands on 
producing information and are often small. Naturally, there are fewer possible 
agency problems, due to the small size of a privately held company. However, access 
from internal control systems is difficult for banks to take part in since there rarely 
are any (Bruns, 2004). Therefore information asymmetry is common between these 
two parties, as knowledge and strategies are more informal, possessed by the owner 
and manager. 
 
There are some actions which banks take to reduce this kind of information 
asymmetry. According to Smith (1993), it is not uncommon to limit the borrower to a 
specific accounting choice, restrain the possibility to sell certain assets or use 
financial ratios as minimum requirements for profitability. This could, however, 
increase agency problems and information asymmetry in the long run.  If companies 
do not reach certain important goals or limits, they might alter the figures one way or 
another; often by using excessive optimism in judgments or activating more costs 
than reasonable (Argenti, 1976). 
 
2.2.2 Transaction cost theory 
Every transaction on the market is associated with costs. Efficient management of 
transactions is therefore beneficial in order to lower these costs. Williamson (1981) 
explains that the better handling of transaction costs, the better functioning market.  
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Banks provide the capital which many companies are in need of to conduct 
operations. However, to ensure the repayment ability and thereby avoid credit 
losses, the bank is naturally interested in reducing the information asymmetry 
between them.  If done successfully in the long run, costs associated with the credit 
assessment process can decrease through more accurate assessments. In turn, this can 
lead to better capital allocation for the market as a whole, as well as to lower credit 
costs for the individual company (Bruns, 2004). 
 
With the above presented theories in mind, dealing with how to satisfy stakeholders 
and users need and how the information asymmetry can be reduced, thus avoiding 
transaction costs, the question of how information is used arises. Accounting 
information from financial reports provides an important basis to make judgments of 
a company’s financial position. Therefore, the next section describes information 
need and how accounting information is used by the primary stakeholders. Also, 
more specifically, how banks are performing credit assessments, based on previous 
research. 
2.3 Use and purpose of the annual report 
A major driving force behind the creation of an annual report is to convey 
information to its users (Smith, 2006). The central issue when it comes to accounting 
is therefore how financial reporting should be formed. 
 
According to Edenhammar & Thorell (2009), external stakeholders’ needs in Sweden 
are of great importance and have been so for many years. Further, the requirement of 
publication in Sweden for even the smallest company is peculiar, as every annual 
report published is available at the Swedish Companies Registration Office. This is 
unlike in many other countries where publication not always is required for small 
companies. 
 
Stakeholders ask for various information depending on their specific interests. When 
comparing different stakeholders and their relationships to the company, it appears 
that the information needs differ. It is also likely that the information need varies 
within the same group of users (Smith, 2006). Depending on the size of a company, 
the number of stakeholders varies. A small business is generally rather 
uncomplicated, with the same owner and manager (Edenhammar & Thorell, 2009). 
The larger the company, the greater demands for publication due to more and larger 
stakeholder groups. 
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Lenders primarily want information about repayment ability on loan and interest as 
well as collateral (Svensson, 2003). They are therefore interested in liquidity and 
solvency which can be linked to credit risk (Andersson, 2001). Shareholders, on the 
other hand, occupy a special position since their compensation is not contractually 
committed unlike most other stakeholders (Smith, 2006). Their return is thus 
dependent on a residual of what is left after other stakeholders have had their fair 
share. That is also why their interest mainly is about return on their invested capital. 
Another significant difference between these two users is how they view a 
company’s future development, as lenders have an ‘either or’ perspective on a 
borrower’s ability to repay the loan (Smith, 2006). This is in accordance with the shift 
towards a going concern approach for banks, where focus lies in investigating 
whether a company will be able to continue its operations on its premises or not 
(Berry & Robertson, 2004). In contrast, shareholders focus on all possible future 
scenarios (Smith, 2006). 
 
Differences in information requirements are substantial between public and privately 
held companies (Edenhammar & Thorell, 2009). Due to the wide stakeholder circuit 
that a publicly held company has, the information for practical reasons should be 
accessible. Privately held companies do not have the same requirements for 
disclosures in the annual report. This gives them a greater opportunity to be selective 
when providing information to a stakeholder (Edenhammar & Thorell, 2009). 
However, both Smith (1993) and Svensson (2003) conclude that banks often demand 
extra information and include these demands in the credit contract. 
 
Since the annual report distinctively focuses on the need of users for their decision-
making, the question has arisen to what extent it actually is adapted to its users. 
Young (2006) therefore wanted to explore what is taken for granted, that is if 
accounting information is useful to the users. Principles of accounting methods that 
are developed by standard setters, such as accountants and auditors, are not based 
on interests of investors or other users (Young, 2006). Further, the overall goal for the 
standard-setting in accounting is stated to be usefulness for users. This is however, 
according to Young (2006), created from a self-constructed rational user of financial 
data, rather than knowing how users in reality use the information. 
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2.4 Credit assessment 
One specific business common in the banking world is corporate credit granting. In 
order for the bank to make accurate assessments, the bank as a stakeholder and user, 
concentrates on certain aspects and is in need of useful information to evaluate a 
company. When assessing a credit application from a company, main focus lies in 
deciding if the borrower will be able to repay loan and interest (Svensson Kling, 
1999). It is in their nature as profit making organizations, but is also stipulated in the 
Swedish law, Lag (2004:297) om bank- och finansieringsrörelse 8:1. It says that a 
creditor should make sure that the borrower can repay the loan and also, if 
necessary, issue collateral. Further, Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority has 
issued policies on how to work with credit risk, including requirements about a 
creditor’s right to sufficient information to evaluate the company’s financial position. 
Also to evaluate the possibility to repay the loan and if there is any risk for 
devaluation in issued collateral (FFFS 2004:6). 
 
Uschida (2011) points out that to grant or not to grant credit are built on three factors: 
relationship, financial statements and collateral. The main focus in Swedish banks is 
on produced financial statements and activities that shift risk from the bank to the 
borrowing company (Bruns & Fletcher, 2007). According to Bruns and Fletcher 
(2007), creditors also take into account previous performance in projects and in 
relationship to the bank. The need for collateral is greater when it comes to smaller 
companies, though the main focus is still on the repayment ability (Svensson, 2003). 
Companies that are new to the bank also need to prove that they possess the 
competence to succeed with their new project. Owners or board might have to issue 
personal collateral, especially if the company has a weak financial position (Bruns & 
Fletcher, 2007). 
 
Credit assessment is performed by a loan officer, where experience and knowledge 
might have an impact on the credit granting process. Andersson (2001) found out 
that more experienced loan officers reviewed more information than new loan 
officers. However, more experienced loan officers were more likely to reject a loan 
application than the less experienced. Andersson (2001) explains that with the fact 
that a rejection of a good application is less damaging than grant a credit and have 
the company default and thus get credit losses. 
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2.4.1 Use of accounting information in credit assessment 
Bruns and Fletcher (2007) conclude that lenders place most focus on presented 
accounting figures. Further, Andersson (2001) explains that banks consider that 
financial statements are quite reliable because of the audit requirement in Sweden. 
Financial reports such as income statement, balance sheet and cash flow report are 
mainly used in prediction models. There are several studies showing that the use of 
financial ratios, at least in a short time perspective, is good predictors of a possible 
company default (Andersson, 2001). 
 
Usage of the overall accounting information during the last decades remains an 
important source in the credit assessment process in banks. Previous research shows 
that the importance of its constituents has shifted though. Cash flow analysis, in 
accordance to a going concern approach, has increased while use of balance sheet 
ratios is reduced (Berry & Robertson, 2004). 
 
The normal process in Swedish banks when performing credit assessment is to 
collect financial information from the potential borrower and from UC, were 
information often can be imported directly to the banks’ own systems and from there 
produce financial ratios. According to Svensson (2003), most bankers are satisfied 
with accounting information when it comes to calculate financial ratios, and about 
half of them consider the same about cash-flow and reported values of assets in the 
balance sheet. When it comes to collateral, on the other hand, market values are more 
commonly used. 
 
Argenti (1976) presents some criticism on the use of financial ratios and of accounting 
presented in financial reports. He argues that companies that are underachieving are 
more likely to start using ‘creative accounting’, which means optimistic instead of 
neutral views in judgments and sometimes even producing fake illegal transactions, 
which makes financial ratios less useful as predictors. However, Andersson (2001) 
discusses two earlier studies of companies, showing that bankruptcy could be 
predicted in 80-85 percent with the help from financial ratios. There is some tendency 
to lose predictability using financial ratios in modern time, but if combined with 
market-related variables, the predictability of companies going bankrupt increases 
according to Beaver, McNichols & Rhie 2005. Even though, Svensson (2003) has 
noted that banks sees some problems regarding possibilities to smoothen or affect 
results in a desired way, such as activation of self-generated intangible assets or by 
accelerated depreciation. According to Svensson (2003) it is not unusual to set up 
guidelines in the credit contract on how the company should manage their 
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accounting combined with incentive to follow the contract, for example on lower 
interest rates. 
 
Financial statements are used in banks’ corporate analysis and also in their rating 
models (Riksbanken, 2004). Some rating models can be almost fully automatic, while 
others require more manual inputs (Svensson, 2003). The purpose is to define risk 
when granting credit; the equity a bank needs to hold to cover the credit is based on 
said risk (Riksbanken, 2004). The models include more information than financial 
ratios, such as credit history, market information and information about board and 
owners. Jacobson, Lindé and Roszbach (2005) found out that two Swedish banks that 
had a shared customer base could rate individual companies very differently. 
However, the risk classification in the portfolio conformed quite well. 
 
Both Andersson (2001) and Svensson (2003) discuss the problem with timeliness 
regarding financial reports, as they are often outdated when published. Companies 
that are underachieving tend to wait even longer to release their reports (Argenti, 
1976). However, Svensson (2003) have found that lenders may demand or collect 
accounting information on a more regular basis, if necessary. It is more commonly 
used when granting credit to new customers or companies with a weak financial 
position. Svensson (2003) also concludes that long time customers are evaluated 
more on behalf of personal relationship than accounting information. 
 
How accounting information is viewed by banks may differ between geographical 
markets. Silver (2001) noted that in smaller communities, financial statements are 
used to verify descriptions from board and owner, and information from other 
institutions in the community can also be used to evaluate the information. In larger 
cities the process often work in the other direction. Financial information is used in 
advance, to prepare questions and areas to focus on when meeting with board and 
owners of the company. 
 
Once clarified how accounting information is used by the bank in the credit 
assessment process, next question arises: what kind of information is presented in 
financial reports? There are certain legal requirements, but choosing between 
regulation systems is possible in Sweden’s accounting act structure. Therefore, next 
section introduces the demands for content in annual reporting and a description of 
the K-project recently introduced, consisting of rule-based and the principles-based 
regulation systems. Lastly key differences between the regulation systems are 
presented. 
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2.5 The content of the annual report 
The Swedish Annual Accounts Act (ÅRL 2:1) describes what the annual report shall 
consist of: 
 
1. A balance sheet 
2. An income statement 
3. Notes 
4. A management report 
 
In addition, a large company presents a finance analysis. 
 
2.5.1 Definition of small and large companies 
The definition of a small company is a company that does not fulfill the requirements 
to be considered large, which are more than one of the following conditions 
according to 1:3 ÅRL (FAR, 2013): 
 
 Average number of employees in the company during each of the last two 
financial years has exceeded 50 persons, 
 Total assets of the company during each of the two last financial years has 
exceeded 40 million SEK, 
 Reported net sales of the company during the last two financial years has 
exceeded 80 million SEK. 
 
Furthermore, a company whose shares, warrants or debt securities are listed on a 
stock exchange, an authorized marketplace or another regulated market are always 
considered large. 
2.6 Simplifying K-project 
The Swedish Accounting Standards board initiated a project in 2004, the so called K-
project, in order to simplify the financial reporting for smaller companies. There are 
four sets of accounting regulations, from which a company will choose one to follow 
depending on the size of a company (BFN, 2013). It is the rules and requirements in 
the Swedish Accounting law, BFL, which form the basis for its design. Each category 
contains a comprehensive regulation package with the purpose to meet the 
company's complexity level and other factors. 
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 K1 (BFNAR 2006:1):  Sole traders establishing simplified financial statements. 
 K2 (BFNAR 2008:1): Annual reporting in small companies. 
 K3 (BFNAR 2012:1): Annual reporting and consolidated financial statement. 
 K4 is for companies who must or choose to follow IFRS. 
 
K3 is the main regulatory for Swedish companies, created with inspiration from IFRS 
for SMEs, with adjustments for the connection between accounting and taxation in 
Swedish accounting and other norms and practices (BFN, 2013). It is principal-based, 
in contrast to K2 which is rule-based and therefore contains more restrictions than 
K3. K2 is an option for companies that are considered small according to the Swedish 
Annual Accounts Act. Most of Swedish companies are small (Lennartsson, 2013) and 
therefore able to choose between the new sets of accounting regulations K2 or K3. 
 
2.6.1 Differences between K2 and K3 
The main difference between K2 and K3 is the fundamentals in how the regulations 
are created. K3 is principle-based and K2 is rule-based (BFN, 2012). How effects of 
the new regulations will appear is difficult to concretize since K3 will be applied for 
the first time in the year-end 2013/2014 (BFN, 2012). However, the regulations are 
formulated and there are some substantial differences between them. Not every 
detail is covered in this section, but the main differences are elucidated below. 
2.6.1.1 Tangible and intangible assets 
K2 
 
 
Depreciation: 
Both tangible and intangible assets 
are allowed to be depreciated 
within 5 years with the K2 
regulations, but the real period of 
use can be used. It is not allowed to 
split assets such as buildings down 
to components and depreciate them 
separately. 
 
 
K3 
 
 
Depreciation: 
In K3, the period of use has to be 
estimated and the asset will be 
depreciated during that time frame. 
Tangible assets, such as buildings, 
needs to be split up and components 
need to be depreciated separately. 
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Appreciation: 
Within K2, the only asset allowed to 
appreciate is buildings, with a limit 
of the taxation value, but no 
deferred tax are to be accounted for. 
 
 
 
Self-generated intangible assets: 
Self-generated intangible assets 
arising from research and 
development activities are not 
allowed to activate in the balance 
sheet. 
 
 
Appreciation: 
K3 does not limit appreciation to 
buildings. All assets can be 
appreciated as long as the criteria in 
the Swedish Annual Accounts Act, 
ÅRL, are fulfilled. Hence, there 
should be a reliable and permanent 
increase on the asset’s value. (ÅRL 
4:8). 
 
Self-generated intangible assets: 
There is an option to activate such 
costs arising from research and 
development activities. 
 
2.6.1.2 Provisions, accruals and other costs 
K2 
Provisions: 
There is no need to account for 
provisions, if the amount is less 
than 25 000 SEK or 10 percent of 
the equity capital. Provisions are 
only allowed to account for if 
there are legal or contractual 
obligations. 
 
Accruals: 
All accruals over 5000 SEK needs 
to be moved to the right period. It 
is not necessary if the cost is a 
recurring cost with a maximum 
spread of 20 percent. 
 
K3 
 
Provisions: 
K3 does not have any limitations for 
when allowed to account for 
provisions. 
 
 
 
 
Accruals: 
All costs are subject for evaluation 
and if considered as significant it has 
to be moved to the right period. No 
exceptions for recurring costs. 
 
 
21 
 
 
Leasing: 
All lease contracts shall be 
classified as operational. 
 
Leasing: 
Lease contracts can be classified as 
either operational or financial. 
 
 
Appendix B includes two fictitious companies, X and Y, created according to the 
different regulations presented above. The companies’ financial statements shows 
how differences in K2 and K3 can affect accounting figures in balance sheet and 
income statement, and in extension financial ratios. More information about the 
companies are found in section 3.3.1.1. 
2.7 Rule-based versus principles-based 
All accounting regulations are more or less based on rules; even regulations 
considered as principles-based. Not every transaction is a subject to judgments and 
evaluation, but regulations containing more rules and limits are usually called rule-
based whereas principle-based have fewer limitations and are less specific (Collins, 
Pasewark & Riley, 2012).  
 
The debate around the use of either system has been extensive, and has mainly 
focused on the differences between US-GAAP and IFRS. Main criticism of a rule-
based regulation system, as US-GAAP, is the possibility for a company to structure 
its transactions to go around the rules (Baily & Sawers, 2012; Collins, Pasewark & 
Riley, 2012; Agoglia, Douponik & Tsakumis, 2011). However, the pro rule-based 
regulations argue that rule-based regulations increase comparability, since there are 
less judgments and more specific instructions and bright-line thresholds (Agoglia, 
Douponik & Tsakumis, 2011). Criticism of principles-based regulations as IFRS has, 
on the other hand, concerned that stakeholders loose comparability and that a 
company can, due to excessive optimism or pessimistic view, affect its financial 
statements in a given direction. People in favor of principles-based regulations 
however argue that a company’s ability to make judgments gives better view of its 
real financial position (Baily & Sawers, 2012). 
 
To summarize the criticism, it is based on the opinion that companies either choose 
to work around the rules to achieve desired financial figures, or use the possibility 
for judgments to affect the final result. This aligns with Argenti’s (1976) findings that 
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underachieving companies tend to manipulate their result. Svensson’s (2003) 
research confirmed that corporate loan officers see a problem with the possibilities to 
smoothen the results. A company showing good results almost always performs 
better and a company showing negative results almost always performs worse 
(Svensson, 2003; Argenti, 1976). 
2.8 Summary of the reference frame 
The theories presented in the frame of reference are chosen to enable a thorough 
analysis of the usefulness of financial reports in banks’ credit assessment. They tell us 
that the bank, as a stakeholder and user, is in great need of information from the 
company. There is an existing information asymmetry in their relationship, which 
can be explained with the help from the principal-agent theory. Information 
asymmetry increases transactions costs, therefore it is necessary to find ways to 
reduce the information gap. 
 
Previous research shows that criticism on how accounting is produced concerns 
accounting choices and its abilities of manipulating and smoothening financial 
figures and consequently ratios. Also, differences in regulation structures that causes 
worse comparability. To reduce information asymmetry in the credit assessment 
process, banks do not settle with financial reports; relationship and issuing collateral 
are two important pillars as well. 
The main focus in the debate regarding rule- and principles-based regulations has 
been the differences between US-GAAP and IFRS and problems regarding structured 
transactions and judgments. The K-regulations are built on these two ways of 
producing accounting, which actualizes the debate as they are selectable for 
companies within the same context.   
The reference frame provides important insights and creates a basis for the analysis 
of the empirical findings in chapter five. 
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3. Methodology 
The third chapter explains how usefulness in financial reports, as a part of the banks 
information need, has been investigated. It contains descriptions on how theories, previous 
research and information about the K-regulations were collected. This is followed by 
explaining how the empirical material was gathered through interviews with representatives 
from Swedish banks. To understand how the material was processed, the chapter includes 
descriptions of the analyzing method and possible shortcomings with the chosen method. 
3.1 Research approach 
The task in this study was to gain an understanding of why and how financial 
statements are used to serve as a basis for decision making for the one of the main 
stakeholders. The empirical research concerned how accounting information matters 
in the credit assessment process in banks. 
 
The Swedish accounting regulations, K2 and K3, differs in certain respects. This 
study has focused on analyzing whether these differences may affect a company’s 
creditworthiness or the assessment of a company. To be able to draw conclusions in 
this matter, two perspectives were explored to gain understanding for each side; the 
accounting perspective and the banking perspective. By analyzing the usefulness 
from two angles, conclusions could be drawn about how adapted the information is 
and also its importance in and impact on the credit assessment process. Hence, the 
purpose was to find common patterns among the banks in the empirical study, as the 
investigation was about providing a comprehensive picture rather than highlighting 
differences between banks. 
3.2 Research method 
In order to answer the research questions, the use of a qualitative research method 
were appropriate. This enabled a thorough analysis with space for explanations and 
detailed answers from previous research presented in the reference frame, as well as 
from the loan officers interviewed. Thereby a deeper understanding for their 
perspective as practical users of the accounting information. The findings in a 
qualitative research are thus based on non-quantifiable data in which attitudes, 
values, and perceptions can be gained (Lundahl & Skärvad, 1992). 
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Several arguments for a qualitative research method when performing the empirical 
study could be pointed out. Firstly, the nature of a credit assessment generally is 
dependent on the specific person’s earlier experience and expertise (Andersson, 
2001). A loan officer, who is processing a loan application, has specific intern policies 
as well as legal requirements to adhere to. However, it is difficult to obtain data on 
an aggregated level, illustrating fully how loan officers manage different assessment 
situations. This put obstacles to a quantitative research, which would have been more 
appropriate when data can be quantified (Lundahl & Skärvad, 1992). Secondly, the 
choice of methodology was in accordance with most of the relevant previous 
research on the field. Gathering data from earlier research with the same alignment, 
in combination with an own empirical research with interviews, provided an 
appropriate platform for the analysis of the subject. 
 
Empirical material was gathered through interviews with corporate bank loan 
officers, who possess significant knowledge of the credit assessment process. The 
interviews were semi-structured, with a questionnaire designed to invite to 
discussion (Gillham, 2000). However, this approach enabled quantifying the answers 
to some extent and to find some common denominators (Lundahl & Skärvad, 1992) 
which enabled a perception of their view of a company’s financial position based on 
financial and non-financial information. The interviews were complemented with the 
constructed companies, X and Y, based on the K-regulations. A more detailed 
description of how the interviews were performed can be found in the interview 
guide-section 3.3.2.1. How the constructed companies were created can be found in 
section 3.3.1.1. 
3.3 Data collection 
3.3.1 Secondary data 
In order to create an image of what has been previously discussed in the field that 
was examined; the study took its start in exploring previous research on the usability 
of accounting information for users in general, but primarily on its usability in the 
credit assessment of a company. Information was collected mainly through databases 
provided by the library of Gothenburg University, which has access to a range of 
different academic journals. Besides, several doctoral dissertations in printed form 
were borrowed through the library. 
 
Recognized theories, such as the stakeholder theory and the agency theory, can be 
linked to the relationship between a bank and a company. These theories were 
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outlined in the frame of reference to form an appropriate perspective of the study 
and also to serve as a basis for the chosen subject. Theories presented here were, as 
far as possible, collected from the writers who developed the respective concept or 
from scientific papers or dissertations describing this concept.  
 
Together with fundamental theories explaining why certain phenomenon occurs in 
the relationship between the two parties, the bank and the company, knowledge on 
the use of accounting information formed the next part of the reference frame. Main 
sources used were scientific articles and doctoral dissertations. This gave an accurate 
picture of elements questioned before. In this way the key factors could be identified 
and research results showing differences could be compared. In addition, academic 
literature was used when explaining some essential concepts of accounting and its 
users. 
 
The sections dealing with the Swedish accounting system, annual reporting, the K-
project and rule-based versus principles-based accounting, are based primarily on 
accounting rules presented by FAR/BFN and previous research. The created 
companies were based on differences in K2 and K3 presented in the reference frame, 
to provide a practical example of how differences can appear.  
3.3.1.1 Construction of company X and Y 
Two companies’ financial statements are attached in Appendix B. These companies 
were named X and Y, where X’s financial statements were based on K2 and Y’s were 
based on K3. The two different financial reports were created with the help from a 
real company’s financial report, however either named or associated with the 
original company. The information was retrieved from Swedish Companies 
Registration Office. In this way, it was ensured that the fictitious companies are 
realistic. 
 
When selecting companies from the Swedish Companies Registration Office, the 
main selection criterion was that the chosen company should have the possibility to 
choose between K2 and K3. Therefore companies considered large according to the 
Swedish Annual Accounts Act were excluded.   
 
Another criterion was to choose an industrial company to use as a basis when 
constructing the companies. In this way it was ensured that there were tangible 
assets in the balance sheet. This also made it possible to illustrate the ability to use 
them as collateral and to show the effect of appreciation rules within each regulation. 
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The adjustments in the financial statements were made with the help from a practical 
manual issued by BFN (2012). The main focus when creating the companies was to 
highlight some of the differences in K2 and K3, mainly the ones mentioned in the 
frame of reference. For example company Y, who has activated self-generated 
intangible assets. Both companies reevaluate their property, but with different 
amounts since K2 limit the value to taxation value. There is also financial leasing in 
company Y.  
 
3.3.2 Primary data 
Primary data were collected through interviews with representatives from five 
banks. 
 
The area examined empirically involved how corporate loan officers in Swedish 
banks work with credit assessment when handling a credit application. More 
specifically, what factors that are relevant and which information that is required 
from a company when granting credit. 
3.3.2.1 Interview Guide 
All interviews were recorded after approval from the respondents. The interviews 
focused on the credit process and other areas which a corporate loan officer is 
considered to have knowledge in. The semi-structured interviews were designed to 
steer the direction of the interview but also enable for the respondents to answer 
freely. This enabled the respondent to use own nuanced examples and illuminate 
areas that he considers relevant in accordance to the interview approach, which were 
preferable since the credit granting process to some extent is dependent on the loan 
officer involved in the case. Another characteristic of a semi-structured interview is 
that we, as interviewers, probe the interviewee so that the initial statements are 
elaborated as much as needed (Collis & Hussey, 2009). 
 
An important pre-condition was that each respondent had taken part of the 
interview material beforehand. In this way time was more efficiently used, and it also 
prepared the respondent prepared for the interview.  
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The interview material consisted of the following: 
 
 Interview questions 
 
Before conducting the interviews, it was critical to make sure that the interview 
questions were formulated so that the accurate perspective was reflected by each 
respondent, and that they served as a basis for drawing conclusions on the 
usefulness of financial reports. The bank perspective was in focus, meaning that the 
interview questions focused on their information need and the use of accounting 
information, in order to create a picture of each bank’s credit granting process. The 
interview questions were designed in accordance with the structure of the frame of 
reference. This consistency was crucial when later analyzing and drawing 
conclusions.  
 
The questionnaire can be found in Appendix A. 
 
 Companies X’s and Y’s financial statements 
 
The two otherwise identical companies X’s and Y’s financial statements worked as a 
complement when discussing and asking questions during the interview, mostly 
questions concerning accounting choices.  In this way, the interviewers as well as the 
respondents were able to relate to a real situation, rather than speaking about 
companies in general. According to Gillham (2000), there is a risk of people saying 
one thing during an interview but not acting that way in the situation asked about. 
Andersson (2001) considers this to be quite common among loan officers. Using 
practical examples gave more reliability to the answers from the respondents. It was 
useful to ask quite specific questions even if it was semi-structured interviews. The 
usage of these created companies varied between the interviews. 
 
Companies X’s and Y’s financial statements can be found in Appendix B. 
 
Confidentiality 
The representatives from each bank were presented with name and current position 
before the empirical findings were outlined. To enable more freedom and open 
responses from the respondents (Collis and Hussey, 2009), their name and bank was 
not associated with specific persons’ answers when presenting the empirical results. 
Consequently, each of the five respondents was named by initial A-E. They were 
informed about the confidentiality of their answers, both in the information sent out 
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in advance and also in the beginning of the interview. In the empirical findings 
section, there has been a distinction between what each respondent claims, and how 
the bank as a whole works and approaches. Thus the respondents’ own reflections 
were kept apart from the discussion of general practices as much as possible.  
3.4 Data analysis 
Transcriptions of the interviews were made as soon as they were performed; the 
same day or the following. In this way the information was not lost which made the 
analysis between the interviews easier (Gillham, 2000). 
 
Analysis of the transcribed information was done by marking up useful information 
in the transcripts. The marked information was put into categories that were 
appropriate considering the answers received (Collis & Hussey, 2009; Gillham, 2000). 
Answers were color coded and presented in a table with categories in columns and 
respondents in rows. The three columns dividing relevant responses presented in the 
empirical findings were:  
 
 Banks information requirements 
 Use of accounting information in credit assessment 
 Accounting choices  
 
Within these categories, several subcategories were identified when later presenting 
the empirical findings. There is always a risk for bias since the categories were 
created by the authors, which can misinterpret the respondents’ answer (Gillham, 
2000). To strengthen the credibility, all categories were based on the selected frame of 
reference and consequently aligned in the chronological order of the interview 
questions. Responses linked directly to X’s and Y’s financial statements were placed 
in the last category ‘accounting choices’, as it was only mentioned when asking 
questions concerning accounting information. 
 
The interviews were held in Swedish. Once the interviews were transcribed and the 
empirical material was under study, every response was translated into English 
before presenting it in the empirical findings. This was done with caution to avoid 
distorting responses. 
 
Once the empirical findings were outlined, the comprehensive analysis of the 
empirical material set against the frame of reference took place. The findings were 
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screened several times to find connections to theories and previous research. 
However, the same structure as the rest of the thesis was pursued in order to 
maintain the consistency throughout the whole thesis. 
3.5 Selection of respondents 
Choosing respondents started with identifying the five largest banks in Sweden, 
based on employees, lending, deposits and the size of the balance sheet. Those are 
Swedbank, Handelsbanken, SEB, Nordea and Danske Bank (Swedish Bankers’ 
Association, 2013). Next step was to establish contact with these banks to get hold of 
appropriate respondents for interviews. 
 
Since the interviews exclusively concerned corporate credits and how the credit 
assessment processes works, the selection consequently was corporate loan officers 
with a mandate to grant credit to companies and who do this on a regularly basis. 
The first contact with representatives from each bank was made through their 
customer services, or directly through bank branches in the Gothenburg area where 
contact information were available at the banks’ websites. Phone numbers and e-mail 
details were exchanged. Difficulty of getting hold of suitable respondents varied. 
Personal contacts with employees in two of the banks facilitated the process of 
searching for respondents and made it more accurate. Nordea had no contact 
information to their branches and getting hold of a corporate loan officer was 
particularly difficult, since all contact has to be made through customer services. 
When contact were finally established the interview request was turned down due to 
lack of time. 
 
Instead of interviewing Nordea, a representative from Sparbanken Alingsås, which is 
a part of Swedbank group, was contacted. Since the credit assessment process differs 
between inner-city banks and banks in smaller communities (Silver, 2001) this may 
help the study to get a more conclusive picture. Of course with the confidentiality 
still taken into consideration. 
 
3.5.1 Contact with the respondents during the interview process 
This process resulted in scheduling meetings with representatives from four of the 
five banks desired, however five interviews in total. This amount of interviews can 
be sufficient to achieve an understanding of the area that is being investigated, 
according to Gillham (2000). Time of the interviews ranged from 50-90 minutes. 
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Documents containing interview questions and company X’s and Y’s financial 
statements were sent beforehand by e-mail to each respondent.  
 
When interviews had been held, each respondent were offered to go through the 
interview material before it was published, to ensure that the answers has been 
interpreted correctly. Complementary questions were sent out to some of the 
respondents by e-mail after the interviews had been held.  They were offered to take 
part of the final result of the study. 
3.6 Credibility 
3.6.1 Validity 
The secondary data was selected by the authors of this thesis to create a suitable 
frame of reference. It was essential to ensure that the results showed the chosen 
subject from the correct angle and reflected it in an accurate way (Collis & Hussey, 
2009). Noteworthy is that there might be other appropriate theories and previous 
research available. To frame the study qualitatively and reduce the risk of omitting 
relevant information, a comprehensive literature review was conducted. Not only to 
find interesting previous research on the area, but also to retrieve inspiration from 
their structure and selected reference frame. 
 
A thorough immersion of prevailing laws and regulations was made when creating 
companies X and Y. Also, screening manuals and brochures containing guidelines of 
K2 and K3, issued by BFN. This was made in order to ensure that the created 
financial statements were valid and credible.  
 
Validity of the empirical research 
Previous research and theories has helped creating a picture of central areas and key 
factors worth having knowledge in before interviewing the loan officers. However, to 
be receptive and attentive has been vital in order to ask follow-up questions and get 
the most out of each interview. To ensure accurate focus when reflecting the banking 
perspective, this was of importance since theory and practice only coincide to some 
extent. 
 
3.6.2 Reliability 
To ensure the reliability of the literature that was used, almost all sources were 
scientific literature and doctoral dissertations that has been critically viewed.  
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The adjustments made in companies X’s and Y’s financial statements are only 
possible and may not reflect how the financial statements would have looked if these 
companies had reported within either regulation. A real transition to the new K-
regulations would require a lot more information and time. 
 
Reliability of the empirical research 
Since the credit assessment process is characterized by judgments, there is a risk that 
the empirical research and its sample of respondents were not fully representative.  
As one of the largest banks in Sweden, Nordea, was not represented in this study, 
there was a risk of not getting a fully picture of how the largest banks in Sweden 
performs their credit assessments.  
 
Andersson (2001) found out that the level of experience a loan officer possesses 
affects both the information collected and how they use it. There are also differences 
in how analysis are made, since experienced corporate loan officers are more forward 
looking while junior corporate loan officers tends to focus more on historical 
performances. Moreover, Svensson (2003) states that banks situated in smaller 
locations collect information provided by local knowledge and personal contact 
rather than accounting information. Almost all of the respondents in this study are 
working at branches in Gothenburg, which may have lead to missing out on these 
alternative approaches in smaller locations. However, Sparbanken Alingsås can be 
classified as one such. Once again, it was included in the empirical research to get a 
conclusive picture, without revealing the respondent.  
 
To be able to rely on the findings in this study, the same result should be achieved if 
it was repeated (Collis & Hussey, 2009). As a result of personal reflections from the 
interviewee’s point of view, there may be a difficulty of repeating the empirical study 
fully. However, work procedures should not differ substantially between different 
employees in one specific bank, which made interviewing one representative from 
each bank satisfying. The important thing kept in mind was to critically absorb and 
retell given responses by the respondent. 
 
The interviews were, to different degrees, complemented by companies X’s and Y’s 
financial statements as a basis for discussion. Information about the companies’ 
management and position overall was limited, which made it impossible for the bank 
representatives to draw conclusions based on these financial statements. However, 
its complementary significance strengthened certain assertions when discussing 
questions concerning accounting choices.   
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4. Empirical findings 
The fourth chapter presents the empirical material gathered through interviews with 
representatives from five different banks in Sweden. This is in order to obtain a picture of how 
the bank, as a user, uses the financial information to reduce the information gap between them 
and the company. More specifically in the credit assessment process. The first section contains 
a presentation of each bank and respondent. The second section provides a presentation of the 
responses that came up in the interviews, divided into categories concerning information 
requirements and credit assessment. 
4.1 Presentation of the respondents 
Below a short presentation of each bank and respondent is given.  
 
4.1.1 Swedbank 
Swedbank is one of Sweden’s largest banks in terms of number of customers and also 
has a leading position in the Baltic countries. An interview was made with Niclas 
Frostelind, who works as a credit risk manager for the western region. He has been 
working at Swedbank for almost 25 years, predominantly with corporate matters in 
different working positions.  
 
4.1.2 Handelsbanken 
Handelsbanken has its home markets in Sweden, but also Britain, Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and the Netherlands. What is characteristic for Handelsbanken is its highly 
decentralized organization structure. Patrik Hedemyr, who works as a corporate 
advisor at a branch in Gothenburg, was interviewed. He has been working in the 
banking sector for 11 years; began as a private advisor and then switched to his 
current position. 
 
4.1.3 SEB 
SEB operates mainly in the Nordic region, the Baltic countries and Germany and has 
its emphasis on the corporate section. An interview was made with Reinert 
Siweborn, who works as a corporate advisor at a branch in Gothenburg. He has been 
working at the bank for almost 30 years, of which 15 years have been focused on 
small and medium sized companies. 
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4.1.4 Danske Bank 
The Danske Bank Group is Denmark’s largest financial group, and also one of the 
largest in the Nordic region, including Sweden. Per-Olof Ström, who is a deputy 
branch manager and corporate client manager at a branch in Gothenburg, was 
interviewed. He has been working in the banking sector for over 30 years. First as 
private advisor, but the last 20 years with corporate matters in several different 
positions. 
 
4.1.5 Sparbanken Alingsås 
Sparbanken Alingsås is an independent savings bank, operated as a limited company 
and owned 100 percent by the foundation Sparbanksstiftelsen Alingsås. Over the 
years, some savings banks have united to what is today Swedbank. Others, like 
Sparbanken Alingsås, have remained independent, however with some cooperation 
with Swedbank. An interview with Eric Karlsson was made at the branch in 
Alingsås, one of a total of five branches in the surrounding area. He has been 
working in the banking sector for over 10 years, first as a private advisor for a couple 
of years and then as a corporate advisor at Swedbank. His current position is as a 
corporate advisor at Sparbanken Alingsås.  
4.2 Information need in the credit assessment process 
4.2.1 Classification depending on size of a company 
Four of the five interviewed banks divide their company customers into separate 
categories in a similar way, based on the size of turnover and sometimes complexity 
level. This, in turn, controls how resources are allocated as well as the company’s 
branch belonging, as most of the banks have offices or departments working with a 
particular group.  
 
Small corporates are roughly those who have a turnover between 1-10 million SEK. 
Companies with a turnover of 10 million up to half a billion SEK are considered as 
medium corporates in two of the banks, while companies from 10 million up to 100-200 
million SEK in one of the banks. Large corporates is a category that stands for different 
constellations in each bank, which to a great extent implies listed companies and 
large international companies. One of the banks, however, divides companies based 
on its geographical ties, which consequently steers its responsible branch. From a 
credit perspective, this bank categorizes companies by its level of credit, where a 
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company with credit exceeding 5 million SEK is considered large and all others 
small. 
 
4.2.2 Banks’ information requirements 
New corporate customers 
To form an opinion about how a company’s business works and what contributes to 
revenue is an essential part of the assessment of a company, when granting credit as 
well as creating other solutions; something that all five respondents undoubtedly 
agree upon. Before the first meeting, usually an overall review of the company's 
accounts is done to get a perception of how the company has performed historically. 
The first meeting focuses mainly on the entrepreneur’s detailed description of the 
company's mission statement and how the company generates revenue. Companies 
are handled in accordance with their size and complexity, which determines how 
much time that should be spent and how deep the required analysis should be. 
 
Bank A processes a majority of its new corporate customers through a department 
dealing with incoming inquiries received through the website, where the company 
completes a number of tasks on their activities. Following the evaluation of possible 
initiation of business relations, the department forwards the applicant to the 
appropriate bank branch which continues to establish contact. The department does 
not handle credit applications, but makes an initial assessment of whether the bank is 
interested in creating solutions and funding the applicant. Respondent E explains 
that there are rarely any standard credit applications, it is more about the interaction 
between the company and the advisor. The connection starts with a personal 
meeting, where discussing the purpose of the funding forms the core. On this basis 
the questions are asked on factors which come into play, including the scope and 
complexity of the company.  
 
Respondent D declares that when doing business with a new customer, one should 
make sure to get acquainted with the company thoroughly.  
 
”The longer the process has been, the better the deal later.” – Respondent D 
 
It begins by going through the purpose of switching banks, input values and the 
company’s current stage. Respondent D explains further that openness from the 
outset is beneficial for both parties. Not providing all the information from the 
beginning, as later revealed, could complicate the company's future prospects. All 
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respondents agree that working with a company to a great extent concerns 
confidence for the board, president and owner. Respondent C explains that the 
smaller segments are about personalization and analyzing the person behind the 
company, to identify competencies, possible risks and so on.  Bank C stretches as far 
as stating that sometimes one individual in a company is considered so important 
that it requires a life insurance policy. 
 
Bank A and B prefer having a prior relationship with the people behind the 
company. This means any type of previous contact, either as private customers, 
existing corporate customer or through connections, before financing could be 
considered.  
 
“The risk of business credit is much higher than private credit.” - Respondent B  
 
Since many companies that bank A and B work with are owner-managed, they also 
prefer to do business with the owner’s private banking business, to involve the entire 
chain.  
 
If a company is in its startup phase, bank C rarely provide funding. Further, banks A, 
B, C and E mention that a relatively common business financing solution for a 
company is taking help from one of many partners in the business credit world, such 
as Almi. Bank C sets strict demands and will not take a high risk, reasoning in 
accordance with the other four banks, which can make a partner such as Almi a 
complement for a company that is in an early stage and in need of external capital. 
The respondents mention that this approach is due to their banking policies and legal 
demands of not providing venture capital. 
 
Existing corporate customers 
Each company usually has an advisor who is responsible for the contact and follow-
up. Meetings are held a couple of times a year, which may however vary widely 
depending on the specific company’s situation and stage. The size is also a key factor, 
as frequent contact is more common with larger and more complex companies. 
Meetings are often held at the company’s facilities. Respondent B explains that 
annual meetings aim to go through possible needs for investments in the near future, 
what previously granted credit limits look like and other current issues. According to 
respondent B, it is however often a quick action once a company is in need of 
funding; then quick decisions are required.  Furthermore, several respondents 
mention the need for other persons involved in the company in various respects, 
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such as a board member or finance manager, to participate at meetings if areas of 
their expertise and knowledge will be discussed. This is mostly the case with 
medium or large companies. It also happens that the auditor is present at meetings 
with the bank, according to respondents C and D; either to help gather relevant 
materials or answer questions about transactions. Respondents B and C highlight the 
importance of having regular follow-ups with companies. This enables the 
knowledge of the company’s objectives and possible investments in the future and 
helps avoiding surprises. 
 
There is a distinct forward-looking emphasis among the banks. Respondent C talks 
about the need to get the entrepreneur to explain the company’s future prospects. If 
the plan for example is to expand, what strategy will make it a reality. This applies to 
both new and existing customers. Bank E requests access to the company’s business 
plan, to take part in its vision, budgets and financial targets.  
 
“Insight into a company’s future plans is important in order to determine whether the 
company is suitable for a loan not only today, but for years to come.” 
 – Respondent B  
 
The case for many small companies and entrepreneurs is that they are not always 
versed in economics. Several respondents mention that this sometimes can be 
problematic. According to respondent E, large companies generally are easier to 
work with, in an analysis perspective. This is mostly due to greater availability of 
financial plans and forecasts, together with an accounting function that can provide 
various reports; a prerequisite that a small business rarely has. This could ultimately 
make the analysis difficult when making a credit decision for a small company, says 
respondent E. It is not unusual that there is a lack of explicit plans for the future for 
small companies, according to respondent A. Their activities float on, with the hope 
of making more money in the future; without a specific plan of how to make it 
happen.  
 
All of the banks receive current information from UC of occurrences in the company, 
such as a payment default or change of board members. Respondent D has noticed 
that companies with prosperous business sometimes voluntarily submit monthly and 
quarterly reports, without demands from the bank. However, if business 
deteriorates, there is a tendency that reports are not submitted as frequently.  
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“If a company falls into difficulties and business starts to deteriorate, the economic knowledge 
of the entrepreneur is put to test.” - Respondent D  
 
There are examples of companies whose business has worsened. Thanks to skills and 
competence in the company, relevant reports have been produced, which makes it 
more likely that the bank wants to continue to be financier. Incomplete reports may 
however affect how the bank views a company in terms of risk, states respondent D. 
 
When granting credit, bank B considers that the annual report must be audited. Bank 
A has a strong desire for auditing as well, however prior relationship with the 
company comes into play. If the bank has a previous record of the company, where it 
is known that the financial statements are well, based on experience for many years; 
auditing may matter less. An unaudited annual report for a new corporate customer 
could, on the other hand, be a risk factor, according to respondent A. As a result, the 
bank may demand collateral in the form of personal guarantees. 
 
Banks C, D and E explain that, besides annual report, periodical financial statements 
are also required. Respondent E explains that this, in combination with a budget, 
indicates how well the company meets its goals at closer intervals. Bank C is 
thorough with every detail of the figures reported and can in some cases require 
audited period financial statements, for example when funding in an acquisition 
situation.  
 
4.2.3 Credit assessment 
When it comes to granting credit, all banks require a lot of information in order to 
form a comprehensive picture of the company. That means financial information, but 
also non-financial information, such as the people behind the company, their 
business model and business environment. Their main focus is to identify risk 
factors, to be able to calculate the risk of default and consequently the scope of 
potential losses. Hence, the requirements can be divided into three groups; financial 
information to use both in rating models and in analysis, interaction with the 
company to understand its business, and valuation of collateral. All respondents 
emphasize the importance of knowing the company when assessing their loan 
application.  
 
“Knowing the company is to know their risks.” – Respondent C  
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If the risk is too high, granting credit is out of question. Knowing your customers 
includes many factors, and each respondent mentions various ones. One important 
factor is the knowledge of the respective industry; to measure one specific company 
against others and evaluating a particular industry’s up and downturns. Other 
aspects highlighted by the respondents are to understand how the company operates 
in its market.  
 
“The bank has much expertise in different businesses and industries, but can never know 
more about the company’s business than the entrepreneur, operating on a daily basis.”  
– Respondent D 
 
Understanding the company also includes getting information about its customers 
and suppliers. For example, a few larger customers or suppliers are considered as 
higher risk, compared to many smaller customers or suppliers. Further, a company’s 
inventory value can be a tricky post according to respondents A, C and D. Not 
because of the valuation principles concerning inventory, but rather the nature of the 
inventory itself. Respondent A exemplifies by explaining that if a company is selling 
metal defaults, there will be minimal inventory obsolescence. A company selling 
fresh fish, on the other hand, will have a sharp decline in inventory value quickly. 
Therefore, according to respondent A, it is crucial having a plan of how to handle 
possible default in the fish company, to be able to make use of the inventory value. 
 
Respondent A mentions that personal guarantee is one way of getting the owner 
committed in a possible default situation, enabling the process to go as smoothly as 
possible. It will ensure that the owner stays in the company after a default, to 
preserve as much value as possible. Both banks A and C sometimes have 
requirements of certain insurances, for example life insurance, for a valuable 
employee or insurances that will cover expenses if a property needs to be restored 
due to hazardous productions. 
 
Respondent C brings up legal risk that also needs to be considered. How will, for 
example, an entrepreneur handle a divorce? The legal construction between partners 
is one of many other aspects that needs to be taken into account. Respondent C 
explains that legal requirements sometimes are set up for the company to fulfill, to 
obtain and maintain credit. It is mainly of two kinds. General rules applicable for all 
sizes of companies as well as convergence packages with different financial ratios the 
customer should reach. Respondents A, C and E mentions that these types of general 
requirements concern, for instance, sizes of dividends or demands from the bank that 
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credits should be repaid prior to loan from the owner. Respondent B mentions that 
they try to steer the company’s amortization. For some companies it is regulated that 
a company should reach a certain solidity, yield on assets, or other financial ratios. 
However, respondents A, C and D stress the importance of understanding these 
demands before agreeing to them. Therefore, according to respondent E, it is not 
suitable for a small company with little or no knowledge in accounting. Respondent 
A also includes their quest to sparse the usage of financial ratios in the credit 
agreements, due to the consequence of increased administrative burden for the 
corporate loan officers. 
 
To ensure quality in the decisions made by the corporate loan officers, at least two 
people are always involved in the case.  This is called ‘duality principle’, where the 
loan officer together with a higher decision-making body, such as the branch 
manager, makes final credit decisions. When the size of the credit or the complexity 
of the business increases, decisions are often made higher in the hierarchy; usually 
consisting of credit experts or credit committees.  
 
When presenting the information, experienced loan officers are often better at 
presenting succinct and persuasive cases according to respondent A and E. The 
experience makes it easier to sell the case to other decision makers, according to 
respondent A. 
4.2.3.1 The use of accounting information 
All respondents state that the use of financial information is a matter of course; 
financial reports that contain satisfying numbers form the core in the credit 
assessment.  
 
“We don’t proceed if the numbers are unsatisfactory, even if the person behind is highly 
skilled. The numbers are crucial.” – Respondent A  
 
Respondent E describes two ways of working with the numbers presented. One way 
is to screen the financial statements beforehand and note questions arising when 
trying to figure out the business. Or starting with meeting the company, followed by 
immersion in its financial statements to verify what has been narrated by the 
entrepreneur. 
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Cash-flow 
According to respondents A, B and C, the most important financial report is the cash-
flow statement. Respondent D considers it as important as the other financial reports. 
Respondent E did not rank the financial reports. Respondent B explains that the 
primary focus lies in the operating cash-flow, which enables analysis of the 
company’s core activity. Respondents A and B clarifies that the generated cash flow 
is what will determine if the company is able to repay loan and interest. Since the 
cash flow report only is mandatory for larger corporations according to the Swedish 
Annual Accounts Act, the banks sometimes needs to collect the information in other 
ways than through the annual report. Bank B sometimes requires the company to 
create cash-flow report anyway and bank D sometimes creates the report themselves. 
 
Balance sheet and income statement 
Book values from the balance sheet are often used when valuing business mortgage 
as collateral for credits. Bank B always uses the last annual report when evaluating 
the values and makes roughly calculates, where value on inventory estimates to 40-
50 percent of the book value, 60-70 percent on receivables and 10 percent on fixed 
assets. When referring to company X and Y, the percentages might differ depending 
on fixed assets these companies have, on what the inventory consists of and who 
their customers are. Non-tangible assets are rarely calculated to any value at all, 
according to respondent B. Receivables in a service providing company are often 
valued less than in a retail company, according to respondent A. This is because it is 
easier for customers to claim that the service was not provided or finished, than 
claim non received physical goods. However, when it comes to collateral such as real 
estate, it is more common to use market values since the information in the balance 
sheet often is significantly lower due to decapitations. Respondent D explains that 
they, as a consequence, need to do a real valuation of the property.  
 
Income statement together with balance sheet forms the basis for calculations of 
financial ratios. These calculations are mainly used in rating systems and to identify 
trends; for example if the turnover or costs are increasing or decreasing. However, 
respondent E highlights a risk with the trend analysis. When looking at a one man 
company, the costs and results may vary a lot between the years depending on what 
salaries the owner takes out. Respondent E clarifies that in these cases it is better to 
understand the customer’s situation. 
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Risk rating / Scoring 
All the banks explain that they have their own credit rating system, approved by the 
Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority. These systems are used when classifying a 
company in terms of risk; central in credit granting. This is called credit rating or 
scoring. The credit rating is a part of the assessment process for the banks, together 
with corporate analysis in the form of financial and non-financial information.  
 
The primary use of the credit rating models is to receive an appropriate price on the 
credit to the company, in accordance with its risk classification. Common for rating 
in the banks is that size of the credit and collateral are taken into account. Other 
factors influencing the price, according to respondent E, are competitors’ prices on 
credits and expected yield from shareholders.  
 
Bank A mostly enters hard facts into their rating model, such as information from the 
annual reports and of prior payment defaults. The information is never altered before 
entered into the system. The only factor that might be taken into account is over-
values, primary those related to real estates. For smaller companies, ratings are 
imported from UC, without entering them into the bank’s own rating system. 
 
Bank B has a similar approach. Their systems produces ratings based on the financial 
information and provide ratio measurements divided into two categories. Financial 
strain measures different results and cash-flow based ratios, and financial resilience 
focuses on ratios in the balance sheet. The numbers are not altered before they are 
entered into the system; however soft values are included which has an impact on 
the final rating score and consequently on pricing. Hence, the final rating is made by 
an employee at the bank. 
 
Bank C has an all automatic process for smaller companies, with no changes and 
manual inputs. For larger companies there are more parameters to be taken into 
consideration, including non-financial information as well. Most of the information is 
collected from UC; also company specific information about the board and owners 
can be entered manually for larger companies. 
 
Bank D also collects their information from UC, such as historical data, but also adds 
other types of company-specific information. Bank D does not alter the information 
before entering it to the rating system. The reason for not changing the information is 
to avoid that the involved loan officer’s own feelings or competence which may 
affect the outcome. 
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“The rating system is quite strict, as it should be, because risk lies in the other hand”. 
– Respondent D 
 
Bank E has a rating system which includes all companies with a turnover over 1 
MSEK. The rating is built on financial ratios, behavior and changes in the company, 
such as switching board members. Mostly, the rating system includes hard facts from 
previous annual reports and how conscientious the company has been historically in 
its relations to the bank. In addition, the corporate loan officer grades the company’s 
products, board of directors and more. This, however, does not have a large impact 
on the final scoring. The information is not altered before it is entered into the rating 
model. According to respondent E, the rating is supposed to be based on financial 
history. Altering and testing different scenarios belongs to the corporate analysis and 
does not affect the rating.  
4.2.3.2 Accounting choices 
The banks makes clear that accounting choices are only included in the corporate 
analysis to a minimum extent. There is a considerably greater focus on what lies 
behind the numbers rather than the choice of presenting them. Respondent A refers 
to company X and Y. Since company Y’s balance sheet contains non-tangible assets 
and company X’s does not, a loan officer needs to learn why; not because it is wrong 
or frowned upon, rather to receive a perception of its value in the case of a default. 
Respondent D explains that they take potential over-values in properties into 
account, such as those in companies X and Y, but their evaluation is based on market 
value. In the corporate analysis respondent D also manipulates the figures to screen 
for risk in different ‘what if’ scenarios. For example, what happens when the value of 
inventory rises or a customer defaults? 
 
Bank B has almost the same view as the above, and does consequently not alter the 
numbers when calculating the financial ratios. Adaptations can be done for non-
recurring events, as sale of a property, whose information is usually provided in the 
disclosures of the annual report. 
 
“We prefer audited reports. The accounting choices themselves are not important as long as 
the numbers can be trusted.” – Respondent B 
 
Respondent C is interested in knowing what lies behind the numbers and 
exemplifies with companies X and Y. Both of them have work in progress in their 
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balance sheet. The accounting is understandable, but the bank is more interested in 
how far along in the process these goods are, or if they could be used or sold as they 
are. In addition to knowing what lies behind the numbers, bank C also does pro 
forma balance sheets in order to identify vulnerabilities in the flow and hence find 
potential risks. Non tangible assets and goodwill can be eliminated when analyzing 
how the company really performs. 
 
“Much work is sometimes invested to understand the presented financial information. In 
some cases we ask questions directly to the auditor to ensure that values are correct.”  
– Respondent C  
 
Respondent E explains that when analyzing financial statements, they can be altered 
in simulation models in order to detect weaknesses. The changes are mainly focused 
on other scenarios than accounting choices though. It concerns, for example, what 
would happen if sales drops, the company’s main component becomes more 
expensive, or if the company failures to lower costs as promised.  
 
Even if there are laws and regulations steering the accounting to some extent, there is 
always a possibility to stretch them a bit, according to respondent E. Further, bank E 
has no interest in questioning the choices, however understanding them and being 
able to draw own conclusions. 
 
“A good year-end report is always better and a bad report is always worse.”  
– Respondent E 
 
When discussing accounting choices, all respondents are aware of the newly 
introduced K-regulations. However, none of the banks seem to have an outspoken 
approach towards the changes that the regulations bring. Respondent E explains that 
they will have to adapt to the new regulations; the credit assessment process will not 
change but loan officers need to understand the new regulations. Respondent A 
does, however, mention that how K2 and K3 will affect their credit process is not 
discussed.  
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The banks’ credit assessment process, in summary, is illustrated in the following 
figure. 
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5. Analysis 
In the fifth chapter the empirical findings are analyzed in separated categories. Starting with 
banks information need compared to the stakeholder view and the principal-agent problem 
with information asymmetry as a consequence. This is followed by a discussion of how banks 
are performing credit assessment based on information given by a company, and how 
accounting regulations, such as the newly introduced K-regulations, might affect the credit 
rating outcome, consequently creating transaction costs. 
5.1 Banks’ information requirements  
As Freeman et al (2010) states; the company’s relationships with its environment is 
essential for its existence. The relationship between the company and the bank has in 
the empirical findings shown to be highly reciprocal. Banks exist because of enabling 
business opportunities and creating financing solutions, while the company has 
obligations to collaborate and providing the bank with all kinds of requested 
information. 
 
The company and the bank occupy different perspectives and it is clear that the 
banks want extensive financial and non-financial information, to identify and reduce 
risks before granting credit. The company’s primary interest, on the contrary, is 
obtaining credit solutions to conduct business. These two different positions is 
clearly a subject of the principal-agent theory, which is shown in terms of 
information asymmetry in both directions. Bruns (2004) states that the bank 
sometimes has an advantage because of its knowledge about industries and 
businesses on an aggregated level, which is confirmed by several of the respondents. 
Respondent D however underlines that the bank never is able to know more about 
the company’s business than the entrepreneur. The bank has the power to make 
decisions based on events and fluctuations in a specific industry. This means that the 
concerned company might suffer from information asymmetry, as the corporate 
analysis and credit granting to some extent assumes from occurrences in the industry 
as a whole, which not always is the accurate reflection of the particular company. 
 
The information asymmetry does not solely go in one direction. As Svensson Kling 
(1999) clarifies, there is a predominating information asymmetry among privately 
held companies. Since banks are dependent on the information given by a company 
according to Bruns (2004), it is quite obvious why all of the banks put great effort in 
getting to know the company and its environment, not only by analyzing the 
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financial statements. That is also probably why banks A and B want earlier 
references. This can be considered as a measure to reduce transaction costs, where 
reducing the information gap in turn minimizes the risk of credit losses. As 
mentioned by some of the respondents as well as according to Bruns (2004), there are 
seldom internal systems providing economic data in small companies, which makes 
the banks own analysis even more important. Asymmetric information of this nature 
makes level of experience of the involved corporate advisor a possible factor of 
affecting the outcome of a credit decision, due to highly various cases.  
 
Another case of asymmetric information is identified through respondent D’s 
observation, as companies whose business worsens, consequently stops sending in 
reports as frequently as before. Receiving information from a prosperous company 
therefore seems to be less problematic than with companies starting to deteriorate, 
not always being as transparent. 
 
Since privately held companies has less legal demands to produce information than 
publicly held companies, the banks compensates by retrieving information through 
interaction with the company. The banks has a clear focus on the company’s future 
plans, something that a small company in some cases not has concretized even for its 
own behalf. Information provided in financial statements primarily focuses on 
historical data; the banks however prefer business plans and forecasts to create a 
picture of suitability of possible funding through credit.  
 
The desire for audited reports, and in some cases even audited periodical reports 
when granting credit is apparent when discussing information need with the banks. 
Obviously, not only do they prefer audited reports, but also interact with auditors, 
asking for information about transactions and accounting entries. This is a clear 
indicator that the banks do not satisfy with the presented numbers, rather having a 
critical and questioning approach.   
 
Due to possible information asymmetry situations discussed previously, it is critical 
to form an effective contract, as stated by Eisenhardt (1989), where both parties 
understand the implications and act accordingly. All the banks solve this issue by 
creating contracts that regulates repayment conditions. In this way undesired 
consequences can be avoided, such as transaction costs.  
 
Further, forecasts and future perspectives, in combination with financial reports and 
personal contact, are important in order to satisfy the banks information need. Not to 
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forget the banks responsibility of not drawing large conclusions about the industry a 
company operates in, rather than creating a picture of the company’s own 
preconditions. 
5.2 The use of annual reports 
The requirement of publication in Sweden is clearly working in banks favor. They 
are, to a great extent, using information imported from business data bases such as 
UC. As mentioned by some of the respondents, rating classification is used directly 
from UC without using own rating models, primarily for small companies. This is 
another evidence of the importance of publicity.  
 
Smith (2006) concludes that lenders have an ‘either or’ perspective and Berry and 
Robertson (2004) further found out that banks shift towards a going concern 
approach. Shareholders, on the other hand, build their analysis on all possible 
scenarios. The empirical findings shows this mindset much to be true. Several banks 
do indeed discuss worst case scenarios, and their possibilities of claiming existing 
collaterals if a default situation occur. Respondents C and E however mentions their 
use of simulation models that shows possible outcomes if, for example, sales 
decreases. 
 
According to Smith (2006) it sometimes exist differences within the same group of 
stakeholders. The banks in the empirical study ask for similar information, however 
with some differences, which can be due to the individual corporate advisor as well 
as actual differences between the banks. The banks’ operation approach is steered by 
laws and regulations, leaving no bank free to digress greatly.  
5.3 Credit assessment 
All five respondents discuss three factors that is also mentioned by Uschida (2011); 
relationship, financial information and collateral. The relationship factor shed light 
on operational risks within a company’s business; quality of the inventory, their 
customer base and important suppliers. Financial information focuses more on how 
capital is allocated and ratios between assets and debts. It also gives the loan officers 
information about positive and negative trends, and if the business generates enough 
cash flow to repay loan and interest. Collateral, however, are based on the ‘either or’ 
perspective; how extensive the losses will be for the bank if the company defaults.  
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Bruns and Fletcher (2007) states that banks often work with risk shifting activities to 
minimize their own risk. This can be exemplified with demand for personal 
guarantee, which according to respondent A is used get the owner committed. The 
gains for the bank are twofold in case of a company default. The owner will most 
likely cooperate and try to preserve remaining value in the company, and the risk 
has shifted from the bank to the owner.  
 
Andersson (2001) were able to show that experienced loan officers more often reject 
loan applications than less experienced. This conclusion is to some extent consistent 
with the statement from respondent E. Something that might help reduce such a 
scenario is the ‘principle of duality’, which exists in all of the banks. However, a 
more experienced loan officer often has greater skills in presenting the case in a 
compelling way for the decision making instance, according to respondent A and E. 
This suggests that a more experienced loan officer would have a higher ratio of 
approved applications. Impacts due to level of experience can however not be 
verified with certainty in this study. Further, there can be no decisive conclusion if a 
company benefits from having a more experienced loan officer when proceeding 
credit applications. 
 
5.3.1 Accounting information 
One of the most important reports for almost all of the banks in the empirical study is 
the cash flow report. Berry and Robertson (2004) found out that the importance of 
financial information remained the same, however with greater focus on the core 
processes, hence cash flow. This is in accordance with how the respondents reason. 
Since it is not mandatory to produce cash flow report for small companies, the banks 
need to either create the information themselves or require the company to do so. As 
accounting information is supposed to be created for users, where banks are one of 
the primary stakeholders for even the smallest company, one could argue that the 
cash flow report should be mandatory despite company size. Another perspective of 
the usefulness in this matter is, however, that the information is sufficient enough to 
create complementary needed reports, which thereby makes it useful. In this way, 
increased administrative burden is avoided for companies that are not in need of 
producing cash flow reports. 
 
Other financial reports, including balance sheet and income statement, are used 
mainly in rating models to calculate financial ratios and as a part in the risk 
classification process according to all respondents. Beaver, McNichols & Rhie (2005) 
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concluded that financial ratios together with market variables are good predictors of 
a future company default. This explains why the banks put great trust in the rating 
system when evaluating a company and also why information about products, board 
and industry is included in the rating classification. 
 
Financial information collected from UC is considered to be reliable, so reliable that 
ratings sometimes are used directly without processing the information through their 
own system. Svensson (2003) concluded that most of the loan officers are satisfied 
with the received financial information. The empirical findings indicate the same, 
with one exception. Collateral in properties are almost always valued to market 
value, which means that the bank have to do a real valuation of the property. 
Perhaps they would do so even if the information was disclosed, due to the 
sometimes vast amounts involved in the balance sheet. 
 
A problematic area is the timeliness regarding financial reports. Both Andersson 
(2001) and Svensson (2003) discuss this matter in their doctoral theses. As a result, 
almost all of the banks collect periodical financial reports when performing credit 
assessment, even if it is only mandatory for a company to submit yearly reports 
according to the Swedish Annual Accounts Act. Even if the banks require more 
frequent reports than year-ends, they seem to be satisfied despite that these reports 
often are un-audited. 
 
5.3.2 Accounting choices and its impact on credit rating 
Respondent E claims that “A good annual report is always better and a bad annual report 
is always worse”, which is almost the same conclusion as Argenti (1976) and Svensson 
(2003). This indicates that the banks are aware of impacts that accounting choices can 
have on financial statements. Svensson (2003) mentioned that some loan officers had 
problems with results smoothing activities, which cannot be supported in this 
empirical study, since none of the respondents discussed this problem. Maybe it is an 
effect of the extended use of cash flow reports.  A difficulty when assessing a 
company that was mentioned by several respondents was, however, the existence of 
non-tangible assets and goodwill in the balance sheet, mostly because of its little or 
no value in case of default.  
 
While predictions, simulations and alterations are performed in the corporate 
analysis, nothing is being adjusted when the banks enter financial information into 
their rating systems. However, bank B determines the rating themselves, outside the 
system. Accounting choices would therefore likely have little or no impact on 
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whether to grant credit or not, considering the thoroughly corporate analysis 
procedure. When it comes to interest rates, on the other hand, accounting choices 
may affect the outcome.  
 
Jacobson, Lindé and Roszbach (2005) did not investigate accounting choices; they did 
however investigate two banks with a common company customer where the same 
company could receive very different ratings. That means not only the accounting 
choices matter; the rating can also differ between banks. To what extent and how 
much remains unsaid in this study, since there has been no detailed investigation of 
the rating systems’ structure. Also, even though the accounting choices may lead to 
substantial differences in the presented statements and ratios, no company is fully 
like another.  
 
The phenomenon with different ratings depending on accounting choices has 
probably not arisen in connection with the introduction of K2 and K3. It probably 
already exists due to different accounting choices that companies in Sweden had 
earlier. However, it might be more prominent since K2 removes a lot of possibilities 
in contrast to K3. The differences in companies X’s and Y’s financial statements are 
substantial; almost all financial ratios are affected. The respondents’ main focus in X’s 
and Y’s statements was that one company had non-tangible assets and the other 
company did not. The other differences were not highlighted by the respondents.  
 
A company that has a desire to obtain credit as cheap as possible should choose the 
regulation that delivers the most beneficial financial ratios. The rule-based 
regulation, K2, have several limitations which inhibits the company to make 
adjustments according to accounting choices. Consequently, the most preferable 
regulation system would be K3, due to larger room for own choices. That is, 
however, rarely the only aspect to consider. K3 requires more resources to produce 
than K2. Companies about to choose between the K-regulations has to consider the 
possible gains that come with a possible lower cost of credit against the increased 
expenses to produce K3 reports. It is also important noting that K2 could be the 
regulation that produces the most beneficial ratios as well. It all comes down to the 
particular company’s preconditions. 
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5.4 Final discussion 
This study shows that accounting information is useful and represents one of the 
main components in the corporate analysis when performing credit assessment. The 
bank, as a user, seem to be satisfied with the provided information.  
 
A company’s financial information is used directly in the banks’ rating systems. Two 
identical companies, apart from differences in chosen regulation system, may receive 
different ratings and consequently different interest rates, to what extent however 
not stated. Companies within the same context are able to choose between a rule-
based and a principles-based regulation system. In the same time, one of the largest 
users do not take differences in accounting principles and regulations into account 
when evaluating a company.  
 
It appears that accountants and loan officers tend to speak different languages, in 
accordance with Young’s (2006) conclusion. As accountants question if a building 
should be depreciated as a whole or depreciate all components separately, loan 
officers ask for information about the property’s market value. Accountants discuss 
whether a company should activate their costs for research and development or not, 
while loan officers’ question its value in case of default.  
 
However, the way banks work in order to reduce information gaps between them 
and the company is favorable when changes in accounting regulations are 
implemented. As banks focus on interaction with the company and understanding its 
business environment when granting credit, their corporate analysis as a whole is not 
especially affected by changes in how financial reports are produced. However, 
banks should be aware and continuously evaluate how regulations might affect their 
corporate analysis and risk classification of a company. There might be a need of 
greater knowledge of accounting regulations for individual loan officers as well as 
incorporation at a strategic level. Reducing the barrier that partially exist between 
accountants and banks could be a part of efforts to avoid  ineffective allocation of 
resources, which otherwise causes transaction costs for the banking industry as well 
as its surroundings, including companies and society as a whole. 
  
52 
 
6. Conclusions 
In the sixth chapter, conclusions based on the previous chapter are outlined. Each research question is 
presented and answered, to ensure that the purpose of this study has been fulfilled. Finally, 
suggestions for further research are presented. 
6.1 Conclusion 
 What kind of information is demanded (financial and non-financial) and how is it 
used when banks are performing credit assessments? 
 
When performing credit assessment, the bank tries to collect as much information 
about the company as possible. The core information consists of financial reports 
including income statement, balance sheet and cash-flow reports. This information is 
used in two ways. It is partly entered to banks rating systems that generates ratings, 
which in turn determines a company’s interest rate. Financial information is also 
used to verify information in the corporate analysis. 
 
Another important aspect in credit assessment is the relationship factor. Loan officers 
go through prior engagements with the company and arrange meetings with board, 
owners and, if they exist, finance departments. In this way they can gain deeper 
understanding for the business and its potential risks. Depending on the nature of 
business, potential risks can be financial or associated with market, customers and 
suppliers. 
 
Most loans require some sort of collateral, depending on the size and nature of the 
credit. For some collateral, values in the balance sheet are used. Market values are 
more common though, which means that there is a need of a thorough investigation 
and valuation of these assets. 
 
 How does accounting information from financial reports matter for Swedish banks as 
users? 
 
Accounting information represents one of the main components in the corporate 
analysis when making credit assessment. A company with a weak financial position, 
or difficulties of providing satisfying reports, will have a harder time obtaining credit 
than a company with a strong financial position, delivering complete reports. 
53 
 
However, even if the financial information is satisfying, the company has to present a 
convincing business idea, and be prepared to issue collateral. 
 
Information not included in annual reports is collected in other ways; such as 
meetings and visits at the company’s facilities. This is necessary since loan officers 
need to understand and learn how the company operates. It would be virtually 
impossible to create financial reports covering the total information need when 
performing credit assessment. The larger transaction, the more extensive analysis is 
required. This while users, as small private investors, likely are satisfied reading 
annual reports and analyses provided by analysts from large institutions. 
 How can differences in accounting regulations, as the ones between K2 and K3, affect 
a company’s creditworthiness?  
 
The way corporate analysis is conducted by loan officers from the banks represented 
in this study, questions concerning accounting choices and rule-based versus 
principles-based are redundant. They do not affect the probability of obtaining 
credit.  
Financial information in corporate analysis is mainly used to verify statements from 
board and owners, calculate financial ratios, and identify trends. The new regulations 
K2 and K3 will not, at least for now, affect how the bank conduct their credit 
assessment. Criticism has concerned problems with structured transactions within 
rule-based regulations, and the problem with overly positive or negative assessments 
from the company board within principles-based regulations. This, however, seems 
to be a non-issue for banks, mainly for two reasons. Firstly, they trust the presented 
financial statements because of the audit requirement in Sweden, and secondly, 
because of their own thorough corporate analysis.  
The choice between K2 and K3 leads to different accounting rules to follow, which in 
turn opens for substantial differences in financial statements and ratios. As banks 
import financial information straight into rating systems, the choice of K-regulations 
may affect rating and consequently the price of credit in terms of interest rate.  
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6.2 Future research 
This study provides input for further research. It is found that financial reports 
represent a key element in the corporate analysis as well as pricing of the credit for 
banks in their credit assessment. What is known is also that the new K-regulations, 
mandatory for companies in Sweden from year-end 2014, can lead to differences in 
financial statements and ratios. Credit rating classification and consequently pricing 
may be affected by which regulation system, K2 or K3, a company chooses to follow. 
It would therefore be interesting to do an investigation of how ratings are calculated 
in banks’ rating systems, and more specifically how differences due to accounting 
regulations comes into play. 
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8. Appendix 
Appendix A 
Questionnaire 
 Berätta lite om dig själv och din position. Vad har du för arbetsuppgifter och 
vad har du arbetat med tidigare i banken? 
 Hur delar ni upp olika storlekar på bolag? 
Kreditprocessen  
 Hur ser processen ut när ni får en låneansökan från ett litet/medelstort 
företag? 
 Vad använder ni för interna modeller och system för att utvärdera ett företag? 
 Vilken information förutom den som finns i de finansiella rapporterna från ett 
bolag brukar ni vilja ha från företaget? 
 Hur stor roll spelar erfarenhet hos den företagsrådgivare som ansvarar för 
låneansökan? 
 Vilka nyckeltal är viktiga för er att titta på? 
 Vilka faktorer spelar in på huruvida ett bolag har låg och hög risk?  
Redovisningsinformationen 
 Hur viktiga är de finansiella rapporterna (balans- och resultat) i ert dagliga 
arbete? 
 Kan det finnas några svårigheter med att bedöma ett företag utifrån 
redovisningsinformationen?  
 Hur ser ni på de redovisningsval som finns? Gör ni några egna justeringar? 
 Vilka kunskaper bör man ha inom redovisning för att kunna göra en 
bedömning? 
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Appendix B 
Company X 
Resultaträkning År 2 År 1 
   Rörelsens intäkter 
  Nettoomsättning 39 147 393 36 586 348 
Produkter i arbete 131 246 -1 312 457 
Övriga rörelse intäkter 84 862 424 311 
 
39 363 500 35 698 203 
   Rörelsens kostnader 
  Råvaror och förnödenheter -27 863 919 -25 330 836 
Övriga externa kostnader -3 774 719 -2 693 557 
Personalkostnader -6 498 485 -6 309 209 
Av- och nedskrivning -246 712 -236 178 
 
-38 383 836 -34 569 779 
   Rörelseresultat 979 665 1 128 423 
   Resultat från finansiella poster 
 Ränteintäkter 4 464 4 252 
Räntekostnader -186 968 -211 793 
 
-182 503 -207 542 
   Resultat efter fin. poster 797 161 920 882 
   
   Resultat före skatt 797 161 920 882 
   Skatt på årets resultat -159 432 -184 176 
   Årets resultat 637 729 736 705 
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Balansräkning 
  
   Anläggningstillgångar 
  
   Materiella anläggningstillg. 
  Byggnader och mark 2 165 473 1 302 540 
Maskiner 182 083 273 124 
Inventarier och verktyg 83 397 125 095 
 
2 430 952 1 700 759 
   Immateriella anlägningstillg. 
  Egen upparbetade immat. 0 0 
 
0 0 
   Summa anläggningstillg. 2 430 952 1 700 759 
   Omsättningstillgångar 
  
   Varulager m.m. 
  Råvaror och förnödenheter 1 944 211 1 817 019 
Pågående arbeten för annan 2 331 873 2 220 831 
 
4 276 084 4 037 851 
   Kortfristiga fordringar 
  Kundfordringar 2 592 801 2 338 633 
Övriga fordringar 1 402 147 1 557 941 
Förutbetalda kostnader 127 784 116 168 
 
4 122 732 4 012 741 
   Kassa bank 422 654 338 123 
   Summa omsättningstillgångar 8 821 469 8 388 715 
   Summa tillgångar 11 252 421 10 089 474 
   
   
   Eget kapital 
  Aktiekapital 600 000 600 000 
Uppskrivningsfond 976 905 0 
 
1 576 905 600 000 
   Balanserad vinst 1 976 052 1 439 346 
Årets resultat 637 729 736 705 
 
2 613 781 2 176 052 
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   Summa eget kapital 4 190 686 2 776 052 
   Långfristiga skulder 
  Skulder till kredit institut 520 800 744 000 
 
520 800 744 000 
   Kortfristiga skulder 
  Checkräkningskredit 159 048 198 810 
Skulder till kredit institut 28 350 81 000 
Leverantörsskulder 3 570 833 3 400 794 
Övriga skulder 1 467 921 1 741 850 
Uppskjuten skatt 0 0 
Skatteskuld 159 432 184 176 
Upplupna skulder och 
förutbetalda intäkter 1 155 350 962 792 
 
6 540 935 6 569 422 
   
   Summa eget kapital och skulder 11 252 421 10 089 474 
 
 
Nyckeltal År 2 År 1 
   
   Soliditet 37,24% 27,51% 
Skuldsättningsgrad 1,69 2,63 
   Räntabilitet totalt 8,75% 11,23% 
Räntabilitet 
sysselsatt 16,99% 23,33% 
Räntabilitet eget 19,02% 33,17% 
   Skuldränta 2,65% 2,90% 
Låneränta 11,67% 10,19% 
Räntetäckningsgrad 5,26 5,35 
   Kassalikviditet 69,49% 66,23% 
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Company Y 
Resultaträkning År 2 År 1 
   Rörelsens intäkter 
  Nettoomsättning 39 147 393 36 586 348 
Produkter i arbete 131 246 -1 312 457 
Övriga rörelse intäkter 84 862 424 311 
 
39 363 500 35 698 203 
   Rörelsens kostnader 
  Råvaror och förnödenheter -27 863 919 -25 330 836 
Övriga externa kostnader -3 043 719 -2 693 557 
Personalkostnader -6 498 485 -6 309 209 
Av- och nedskrivning -553 861 -321 461 
 
-37 959 985 -34 655 062 
   Rörelseresultat 1 403 516 1 043 140 
   Resultat från finansiella poster 
 Ränteintäkter 4 464 4 252 
Räntekostnader -196 968 -211 793 
 
-192 503 -207 542 
   Resultat efter fin. poster 1 211 012 835 599 
   
   Resultat före skatt 1 211 012 835 599 
   Skatt på årets resultat -242 202 -167 120 
   Årets resultat 968 810 668 479 
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Balansräkning 
  
   Anläggningstillgångar 
  
   Materiella anläggningstillg. 
  Byggnader och mark 2 969 791 1 302 540 
Maskiner 182 083 273 124 
Inventarier och verktyg 150 063 225 095 
 
3 301 937 1 800 759 
   Immateriella anlägningstillg. 
  Egen upparbetade immat. 698 511 170 567 
 
698 511 170 567 
   Summa anläggningstillg. 4 000 448 1 971 326 
   Omsättningstillgångar 
  
   Varlulager m.m. 
  Råvaror och förnödenheter 1 944 211 1 817 019 
Pågående arbeten för annan 2 331 873 2 220 831 
 
4 276 084 4 037 851 
   Kortfristiga fordringar 
  Kundfordringar 2 592 801 2 338 633 
Övriga fordringar 1 402 147 1 557 941 
Förutbetalda kostnader 127 784 116 168 
 
4 122 732 4 012 741 
   Kassa bank 422 654 338 123 
   Summa omsättningstillgångar 8 821 469 8 388 715 
   Summa tillgångar 12 821 917 10 360 041 
   
   
   Eget kapital 
  Aktiekapital 600 000 600 000 
Uppskrivningsfond 1 411 432 0 
 
2 011 432 600 000 
   Balanserad vinst 2 183 675 1 715 196 
Årets resultat 968 810 668 479 
 
3 152 485 2 383 675 
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   Summa eget kapital 5 163 917 2 983 675 
   Långfristiga skulder 
  Skulder till kredit institut 520 800 744 000 
 
520 800 744 000 
   Kortfristiga skulder 
  Checkräkningskredit 159 048 198 810 
Skulder till kredit institut 103 350 161 000 
Leverantörsskulder 3 570 833 3 400 794 
Övriga skulder 1 494 292 1 741 850 
Uppskjuten skatt 412 124 0 
Skatteskuld 242 202 167 121 
Upplupna skulder och 
förutbetalda intäkter 1 155 350 962 792 
 
7 137 200 6 632 365 
   
   Summa eget kapital och skulder 12 821 917 10 360 041 
 
Nyckeltal År 2 År 1 
   
   Soliditet 40,27% 28,80% 
Skuldsättningsgrad 1,48 2,47 
   Räntabilitet totalt 10,98% 10,11% 
Räntabilitet sysselsatt 20,30% 20,43% 
Räntabilitet eget 23,45% 28,01% 
   Skuldränta 2,57% 2,87% 
Låneränta 11,11% 9,89% 
Räntetäckningsgrad 7,15 4,95 
   Kassalikviditet 63,69% 65,60% 
 
 
 
